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THE EXPENSE OF SPIRIT IN POSTMODERN TIMES: 
BETWEEN NIHILISM AND BELIEF 
or 
Art, Nihilism and Belief in the Postmodem Age 
Thab Hassan 
We are nihilistic thoughts that come into God's head. 
Franz Kafka 
And every Natural Effect has a Spiritual Cause, and not a Natural: 
for a Natural Cause only seems ... 
William Blake 
INTRODUCTION 
William Blake's wife used to complain that she saw little of Mr. Blake's 
company because he was always in Paradise. No doubt, he was among 
Spiritual Causes. But this is not a current complaint - indeed, many 
nowadays would find the complaint quaint, if not downright silly. Why is 
that? The question engages the plight, the expense, of spirit in postmodern 
times. But how give that informing question direction and shape? 
The essay proceeds in four stages as its argument threads between two 
epigraphs, the space between nihilism and belief, narrower than a needle's 
eye. It first recalls briefly the history of spirit in an earlier age; then it seeks to 
give spirit pragmatic definition in our own; next, it considers (in two 
sections) the forms, uses, trials of spirit at present; after which, it confronts 
the issue of nihilism, that icy absence of belief which sometimes masks faith. 
I conclude by facing not faith but its exorbitant demands, its death grip, its 
dying grip, on our lives. 
ONE 
Spirit pervades every culture, every history. For a quarter or half a million 
years perhaps, human beings have entertained an astonishing variety of 
beliefs, astonishing no less in their credible particularity. Such beliefs persist, 
proliferate. Time magazine now runs lead articles on 'Finding God on the 
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Web' and wonders, 'Can Thor Make a Comeback?'; 'Was Teilhard right? Is 
the Internet God's will?' As for the Book of Genesis, it awaits only the 
endorsement of Oprah to become the all-time bestseller. 
We need be neither Catholic in faith nor conservative in politics to 
recognize the point Paul Johnson makes in The Quest for God (1996), that 
'from one perspective - the perspective of human spirituality - the most 
extraordinary thing about the twentieth century was the failure of God to 
die.' Though an agnostic myself who admires the via negativa - how many 
shades of agnosticism are there? - I appreciate the quip answering 
·Nietzsche's exultant cry, 'God is dead,' with: 'No,Nietzsche is dead.' 
It would be easy to adduce the great myths of the world, or the great 
theologies of the world- Hindu, Judaic, Buddhist, Christian, Moslem- to 
prove the sheer semantic energy of the word spirit. Orthodox myths and 
theologies, however, fail to convey the full scope of that energy, which also 
expresses itself in heretical, occult, or antinomian traditions, those secret 
histories and suppressed speculations that Willis Barnstone aptly calls The 
Other Bible (1984). Through all these traditions - Orphic, Hermetic, Platonist, 
Gnostic, Manichean, Kabalist, Cathar, Bogomilian, etc. - runs a strain of 
poetic wildness that, far from undermining spirit, attests to a luxuriance of 
improbable hope. A few examples must suffice here. 
As in Genesis, spirit seems always associated with primal creation and 
light. Thus, for instance, in Gnostic writings, the highest deity is called 
Father of Light. 1 am that Light...,' God says in the pagan tract entitled 
Hermes Trismegistus: Poimandres, 'I am the Mind, the first God, who 
existed before the watery substance appeared out of the Darkness. And the 
luminous Word that issued from the Mind is the son of God.' Similarly, 
God speaks to his prophet thus in The Book of the Secrets of Enoch, a Jewish 
apocalypse: 'Yet I opened up the light and rode through it as one of the 
invisible, as the sun rides from east to west ... I said to the light, "Go higher, 
become firm, and be the foundation for the highest."' 
The dualism in this apocryphal tradition heightens by its contrasts the 
identification of light with spirit. It creates a play of shadows, a kind of 
spiritual chiaroscura, suggesting a hierarchy in the realm of spirit. Thus, in 
the Gnostic Secret Book of John, pure 'Spirit is a Unity, over which no one 
rules... It is the immeasurable Light, the holy and pure purity, the 
indescribable, perfect and imperishable.' This establishes the possibility of an 
aristocracy of the invisible. In the hermetic Poimandres, for instance, the 
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nous is highest Godhead, from which emanate the logos (word), the 
Demiurge (creator of matter), and anthropos (humanity). In other Gnostic 
works, psyche (the soul) is of a lower order than spirit (pneuma); and the 
Zohar distinguishes between nefresh (the vital soul), ruah (a higher spirit), 
and, higher still, 'the ineffable grade which is that of neshamah' (the super-
soul). All this permits dynamic transformations, a spiritual ascent 
culminating in the Absolute. 
Interestingly enough, spiritual hierarchy seems wholly compatible with 
silence, formlessness, the ineffable, that kenosis or self-emptying so 
movingly expressed in various ancient and medieval texts. 'The dew of the 
Lord ringed me with silence I and a cloud of peace rose over my head,' starts 
a poem in The Odes (not the Song) of Solomon, a hauntingly beautiful piece 
of Jewish Pseudoepigrapha. The ecstacy of oblivion is but a shade of God's 
shapeless attributes. Thus, for instance, the Pseudo-Dionysius prays, in his 
Mystical Theology, 'to enter within the super-bright gloom, and through not 
seeing and not knowing, to see and to know' what is 'above sight and 
knowledge' - a presage of that mystical masterwork, The Cloud of 
Unknowing. 
Let us catch our breath, recapitulate, and give the ineffable a rest. After 
all, 'we know better than that' after two millennia of fumbling history. But 
do we know how to act better on what we know? Perhaps more than 
canonical texts, the secret tradition reveals some of the raw spiritual 
aspirations of human kind. Aspirations only? 'Is it not sheer dogmatic folly,' 
William James asks in The Will to Believe (1897), 'to say that our inner 
interests can have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world 
may contain? ... And if needs of ours outrun the visible universe, why may 
not that be a sign that an invisible universe is there?' 
I leave that supreme question open, as James did, and return to what 
the secret tradition - I think of it also as wild, fantastic - divulges. It shows, 
first, a spontaneous association between spirit and the primal energy of the 
cosmos - light, whose speed is a universal constant of science. Think of it: 
what curious, photic intuition is that? What trope binds consciousness to 
the physical universe, binds true knowledge to sight? Second, the secret 
tradition insists on grades, gradations, and graduations of spirit, an internal 
action, a sense of perfectibility that the 'perfects' embodied. Spirit evolves, 
ascends, till it reaches a limit condition, like light - though in Manichean 
systems, it may lose out to the Dark. Third, the tradition ultimately refuses 
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to articulate spirit in a specific fonn: the Absolute has no attributes. The very 
principle of linguistic similitude breaks down. To manifest himself, God 
may assume the Ten Sefirot, or qualities, that the Zohar lists. But the 
question, 'To whom then will ye liken God?' can only be answered by 
silence. 
Hence the implacable dilemma of the topic: how speak of what none 
can utter? Thus I must circle, stutter, stumble around discursively, without 
hope of discovering 'an ecstasy and simplification,' as Plotinus might say, yet 
still try to assess the expense of spirit in postmodem times. 
TWO 
The problem I would now pose is this: what can the word spirit mean to us 
in this postmodem moment? What can it mean to academics, particularly, 
who deprecate it intellectually, socially, politically, associating it with 
rappings at a seance, incense in darkened rooms, susurrations of New Age 
beatitude, if not machinations of cryptofascists? Enervated, discredited, 
nearly exhausted, the language of spirit must also endure its own necessary 
insecurities as it questions itself at every tum to evade the baneful extremes 
of dogma and disbelief. Still, despite all its insecurities, the language - more 
stubborn than any stone Dr. Johnson kicked - endures by the sheer force and 
ferocity of its appeal to mortals. 
What, then, do I mean by spirit? As word, concept, feeling, spirit seems 
too multiform to suffer definition - the kind of definition, say, that Rudolf 
Otto gave to the numinous, or that I myself might be tempted to give spirit 
as a human intimation of immortality. Instead of definition, then, let me 
offer a spectrum of intended meanings in this essay. 
By spirit, I want first to challenge the contemporary, cast-iron 
'materialist' paradigm, which shapes discourse in the academic humanities 
thanks to a line of thinkers extending from Marx to Foucault. The paradigm 
is reductive and determinist in its asseverations that we are all 'socially 
produced,' not unlike sausages in a machine, or 'culturally constructed,' not 
unlike erector sets. No doubt, we are so 'constructed' to an indeterminate 
extent. But we also construct society back, as materialist reformers and 
revolutionaries should be first to admit; we are further self-created; and a 
few genes and much contingency have been known to affect individual 
destinies. 
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Next, I mean to underscore the obvious fact, perhaps too obvious for 
certain intellectuals, that human beings care enormously about immaterial 
things: love, courage, friendship, dignity, creativity, sacrifice ... , which all 
shade into spiritual concerns. We cannot begin to understand the geopolitics 
of our moment if we entirely ignore immaterial factors in developing as in 
developed societies. I would hazard, for instance, that a Somali may 
sometimes push himself closer to starvation rather than see a U S Marine 
strut on the streets of his village. Why is that? And why does a Harvard-
educated Iranian woman choose to wear the chador? What urge to self-
sacrifice or self-transcendence enables these Moslem women to subjugate 
themselves, in full knowledge of their act, to some imperative they perceive 
to be fulfilling? 
Moreover, I must accent the role of beliefs, ranging from the trite to the 
transcendent, in the conduct of everyday life. James called it the 'will to 
believe' or 'our willing nature,' by which he meant 'all such factors of belief 
as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the 
drcu.mpressure of our caste and set.' In truth, we would fail to leave bed 
each morning were it not for the assumptions of our existence. Where do 
these come from? How do they develop in individuals so variously? Is there 
a hierarchy of beliefs, one belief trumping the others in a particular situation 
as in the case of the chadored woman? And in our hybrid, interactive, 
interdependent, in-your-face world, how do we mediate conflicting beliefs, 
warring values? 
Further, I need to recall the role of certain dematerialising technologies, 
from telephone and telegraph through television and satellite, to computer 
and laser. These technologies, as Marshall McLuhan and Buckminster Fuller 
foresaw, contribute to a vast, invisible process of derealisation, 
ephemeralisation, etherealisation, of matter turned into energy, of message 
scattering and semiotic dispersal and cognitive dissemination, which I have 
called the 'new gnosticism.' Language has gradually become the human 
environment, more than nature, more than cultural artifact, a noetic space 
that Baudrillard, deriving from Fuller and McLuhan more than he admits, 
has theorised as the 'precession of the simulacra.' In cyberspace, mind - an 
aspect of spirit? - goes to murder and play. And in cyberspace, can mind 
evolve into Teilhard's 'noosphere'? 
Finally, I wish to include in spirit certain fugitive, shadowy, or ineffable 
states of consciousness, alternatives to what James - a psychologist no less 
16 
1997 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
than a philosopher- called our 'ordinary, waking consciousness.' Such states 
seem intrinsic to human experience, and often involve a compelling 
relation to something vital, something wholly other, including death. They 
extend from quotidian intuitions to the creative process in art and science, 
from sentiments of wonder, awe, mortality, surrender, the sublime -
voguish these postmodem days - to mystic illumination. About the last, 
Karen Armstrong says in Tongues of Fire (1985): 'When the religious 
experience of mankind is examined critically, it almost seems that there is 
one, universal religion of mysticism, while the more dogmatic forms of 
religion seem irrelevant to the findings of the mystics and even dangerous.' 
Whether we speak of values, beliefs, intuitions, arts, or dreams, or of 
extraordinary states of diverse kind - especially the gift of seeing the eternal 
in the temporal, the gift of primal relation - we still wait upon brain, 
neurological, and psychiatric research to explain them. Should such 
explanations arrive - and some scientists believe we are reaching the limits 
of explaining ourselves to ourselves - the term spirit will have done little 
harm. For as a mental phenomenon, spirit continues to engage the entire 
human personality, and also to serve key human functions . More, it may 
express, at least metaphorically, an aspect of cosmic evolution. 
THREE 
How different is this compound sense of spirit from some thoughtful 
attempts to reclaim Christianity in our time, to Christianise postmodemism, 
as it were? One example must suffice, not from the 'death of God' 
theologicans, who have challenged us in their day, nor from Gallicised 
'atheologians,' enchanted more by verbal precosities than spiritual quests, 
but from a more traditional Christian, the American writer Reynolds Price. 
In Three Gospels (1996), Price performs a remarkable literary and fiduciary 
feat. Graceful, erudite, tolerant, and insistently Christian withal, he offers us 
there a deeply felt commentary on two gospels - Mark and John - that he has 
translated from Koine Greek, as well as a new, syncretic gospel of his own. 
The work, however, can persuade only believers because it finally resolves 
the most renitent questions of faith in rhetorical proofs, much as the Koran 
claims to derive its transcendent authority from the absolute and self-
evident uniqueness of its Arabic language. 
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Price has lived with the Gospels since childhood, and for more than 
two decades has studied and taught the Bible scrupulously. In the 
countryside near his parents's home, he 'had also undergone solitary 
apprehensions of a vibrant unity among all visible things,' and felt that his 
life was 'willed and watched with care by a god who once lived here.' Such 
feelings, such intuitions, are of course incontrovertible, and they accrue 
immensely to the enhancement of life. 
The difficulties begin, though, when Price makes assertions of a 
different kind. This for instance: 
The man Jesus of Nazareth, a Jew of first-century Galilee whose life affected very few 
of his contemporaries, seems to me to have stood in a demonstrably but inexplicably 
intimate relation to the creator of our world and all that we see and don't see beyond our 
world in this one universe (one of perhaps many). 
One wonders, did the man actually stand in that 'inexplicably intimate 
relation to the creator,' or did the man and his disciples think he did? And if 
the former, where is the demonstration? Invariably, for Price, the blazing 
demonstration turns out to be writerly, as when he alleges, quite plausibly, 
'the hair-raising newness' of the Gospel according to John; or, again, when 
he eloquently observes of Mark: 
The supreme narrators ... can bring us to the very doorsill of the roofless chamber of tot a! 
trust in the power of words to trigger belief. They transport us to that brink, not 
primarily by metaphorical brilliance or linguistic and visual freshness and precision 
but by a mysterious summ<Iling before us of the fact - laden instant in which a visible 
undeniable human act approaches us with godly power - a power which, at the momm.t 
of reading or watching in any case, grips us and forces our full consent. 
But is not that 'mysterious summoning' ultimately verbal, rhetorical, 
effective as proof only on the strength of prior belief, prior disposition to say 
the least? 
In the end, though, Reynolds Price understands that his figure of Jesus 
'is of course shaped and colored by' his own 'predilections.' And he 
poignantly understands the affective depths such a figure attains when, 
recalling the Beloved who leaned on the breast of Christ during the Last 
Supper, the author stunningly remarks: 'Bizarre as it is in so many parts ... · 
[John's] gospel speaks - in the clearest voice we have - that sentence all 
humankind craves from stories: The Maker of all things loves and wants 
me.' And that is where all 'proof and 'evidence' in the case will have to rest 
- unless we can penetrate deeper the mysteries of eroticism and faith. 
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The mysteries of faith inspirit current heterodoxies as well as 
orthodoxies. 'Credo quia absurdum!' a Church Father had cried, none other 
than St. Augustine, bane of Gnostics - as if he had heard James: 'the only 
escape from faith is mental nullity.' But how different, really, is it from the 
cry of Harold Bloom in his Gnostic sermon, Omens of Millennium: The 
Gnosis of Angels, Dreams, and Resurrection (1996), though he opts for the 
'timeless knowing of one's own deep self' rather than faith? 
Many aspects of Bloom's credo will seem attractive, particularly in our 
vacuous, materialist moment - and one aspect will remain intractable, at 
least for me. I honor, for example, his avoidance of disguised spiritual 
resentments; his insistence that revelation, rebirth, and resurrection are 
always and forever now; his search, a touch melancholy, for a revisionary 
spirituality, rich in imagination and the 'quality of unprecedentness.' Above 
all, I find centrally attractive his appeal to the 'unchurched, to seekers of 
many kinds, who are too lucid and spiritually mature to play with New Age 
and Woodstock toys, and yet who know, on many levels, what Emerson 
meant when he wrote in his notebook that 'It is by yourself without 
ambassador that God speaks to you,' and added the deepest truth of all 
Gnosticism: 'It is God in you that responds to God without, or affirms his 
own words trembling on the lips of another.' 
Pending further illuminations, however, I would consider such 
statements part of the legacy and aspiration of the human race, a few more 
images in a radiant galaxy of images that, in the words of Bloom himself, 
'have their own potency and their own persistence,' since they testify to 
urgent desires and needs. And I would leave it at that. For beyond, there be 
not monsters but insuperable queries. Can we really distinguish between 
'authentic Gnosis' and true Faith? How is Gnosis, as 'direct acquaintance of 
God within the self,' distinct from mystical experience or visionary - I nearly 
said delusionary - dreams? What permits Gnostic initiates to discriminate 
between 'inward knowledge' and 'outward belief'? 'Gnosis is the opposite of 
ignorance and not of disbelief,' writes Bloom. etymologically, 
quite so. And pragmatically, is the distinction real? Finally, how differentiate 
between Price, the orthodox Christian, and Bloom, the Gnostic Jew, when 
the latter says: "'Knowing God" has a special twist that makes it the Gnosis: 
it is a reciprocal process in which God also knows what is best and oldest in 
you, a spark in you that always has been God's'? Personally, I know nothing, 
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absolutely nothing, about what God knows - and there remains the 
predicament of most spiritual agnostics. 
Bloom may counter that I am no initiate of esoteric knowledge, which 
is certain. But I can counter back, despite much esteem for his spiritual 
intuitions and poetic knowledge, that he does not follow his avowed 
pragmatism closely enough in acknowledging religious experiences that 
make a difference. For James would acknowledge religious experiences, 
including Price's, that Bloom would find distasteful to admit. Further, I 
would counter that the road of self-knowledge, whether gnostic, meditative, 
or psychoanalytic, should finally lead to the palace of self-heedlessness. 'If 
you seek yourself outside yourself, then you will encounter disaster, 
whether erotic or ideological,' Bloom wisely begins his Omens of 
Millennium. But that is not quite enough. With a touch of Buddhist self-
annihilation, I would add: you may also encounter disaster if you seek 
yourself, not the Self, within yourself. 
Reynolds Price and Harold Bloom travel two roads, one more, the 
other less, travelled by. But once more I must call on William James to help 
us move some distance along this obscure, spiritual way. We find ourselves 
believing, he had said, we hardly know how or why. Actually, James 
adumbrated in a later work, A Pluralistic Universe (1909), the wavering 
steps that may lead to unwavering convictions, from a mere shadowy 
conception to a committed belief. He concludes: 
Not one step in this process is logical, yet it is the way in which monists and pluralists 
alike espouse and hold fast to their visions. It is life exceeding logic, it is the practical 
reason for which the theoretic reason finds arguments after the conclusion is 011re there. 
In just this way do some of us hold to the unfinished pluralistic universe; in just this way 
do others hold to the timeless universe eternally complete. 
Even before our time, a time parlous with skeptical and religious 
frenzies, James knew that no touchstone of reason would help us 
distinguish between too much and too little faith; nor could reason alone 
determine for us what faith to choose. That is why in his 'half-wild, half-
saved' universe, he was ready to entertain an 'unfinished pluralism,' not 
mellow but exigent, ready to face its limitations without dogmatism, ready 
also 'to count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences,' as he 
says in Pragmatism (1907), and 'will take a God who lives in the very dirt of 
private fact - if that would seem a likely place to find him.' How could 
Reynolds Price, or any honest believer for that matter, quarrel with that? 
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Yet even James, that most genial and robust of philosophic minds, had 
his premonition of the darker side of belief: nihilism. We know that in his 
youth, in a stretch of intense personal doubt and metaphysical despair, he 
contemplated suicide. And once he saw the abyss mirrored in the face of a 
poor epileptic in an asylum; the young man sat there, greenish of skin, 
'moving nothing but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human.' 
'That shape am I,' James admits in a kind of existential revulsion. 'Nothing 
that I possess can defend me from that fate, if the hour for it should strike 
for me as it struck for him.' There it was, the void incarnate - firmest 
foundation of faith. 
FOUR 
Some things I have said here may be argued, have been argued, 
interminably. But on this I would insist: we need to refuse the bullying 
choice between postmodem concerns and the idiom of spirit. Increasingly, 
postmodern artists, philosophers, theologians, scientists, psychologists, 
sociologists, critics, do refuse that choice, knowing that a postmodern 
spiritual attitude must also reckon with emergent technologies, with 
geopolitical realities - population, pollution, the growing obsolescence of the 
nation state, the needs of the 'wretched of the earth' (Frantz Fanon) -with 
the interests of feminists and and multicultural societies, with an 
ecological, planetary humanism, with new myths of cosmogenesis and 
millennia! hopes. Sometimes, though, the new thinking, the postmodern 
gnosis, seems too abstract, recondite; sometimes too obvious, decking out 
old thought in smart PoMo clothes, or none at all. Let me give two 
instances, one from art, the other from science, which make a serious claim 
for spirit in our moment. 
A recent exhibition at the Chicago Museum of Contemporary Art, 
entitled 'Negotiating Rapture,' veers toward the esoteric... 'Conceived as a 
series of journeys akin to those of saints or shamans,' the catalogue says, the 
exhibition brings together the work of highly serious artists, such as Francis 
Bacon, Joseph Beuys, Lucio Fontana, Anselm Kiefer, Bruce Nauman, 
Barnett Newman, Agnes Martin, and Acl Reinhart ('the Black Monk'), in 
order to 'reveal their diverse expressions of a shared longing: the basic and 
enduring human urge to transcend the ordinary and experience the 
sublime' - indeed, to 'move beyond common experience to a state 
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approaching religious [and erotic, I might add) ecstasy .. .' With elaborate 
pretension, the essays of the catalogue proceed to help viewers negotiate 
their raptures. 
A common, if dubious, assumption seems to be that art, as a surrogate 
for religion, 'combats the emptiness and malaise that permeates these 
anxious, dehumanised times.' But can it really do that, except for a few 
gnostics or aesthetes? How many feel transports of blackness, or experience 
purgation, before those exacting, subliminal statements of Reinhart's 'last 
paintings'? Perhaps a few, self-selected viewers suffice. Perhaps the function 
of the exhibition, after all, is simply to pose primal questions in a museal, 
now almost sacral, sp11ce. Richard Francis, Chief Curator, does ask: 
Is a spiritual dimension necessary for a full life? Can art, most particularly abstract art, 
help U!l understand spiritual mystery? Does the anunm claim that the D1U!IelliJ\ has 
replaced the cathedral... have any real substance? Can artists aspire to feelings 
associated with religion as methods to express themselves? Is this useful or relevant for 
people who are not making art, but are its consumers, the museum's patrons? 
'Negotiating Rapture,' alas, cannot answer these questions; it can only 
whisper to each viewer according to his prejudice or her belief. And it does 
not, for me at least, negotiate rapture there and then. But it does show that 
postmodem artists engage spirit, beyond irony, kitsch, pastiche. They engage 
spirit along two axes, David Morgan says in one of the more lucid essays in 
the catalogue. 'First, by nurturing a sense of the enigmatic, a profound 
skepticism, a sensibility of suspicion, but one that is nonetheless prepared to 
hope. This is the via negativa, the artistic avenue expressing the kenotic 
impulse. Second is the via positiva, the Faustian way - the theurgy of 
Beuys's utopian art .. The crisis in the second half of the twentieth century 
has consisted largely of the loss of faith in this notion of progressive cultural 
and social evolution.' Hence 'the wilderness of negation' - that is, 
iconoclastic, self-deconstructing, apophatic art, seeking to divest 'itself of 
cultural illusions, the maya of artistic hype and self-promotion.' 
In reaction, however, an exoteric yet still spiritual postmodenism has 
come into vogue. I value its intentions, if not its wishful thinking, which it 
sometimes dubs 'tragic optimism.' Charles Jencks comes here to mind: 
more than anyone else, he brings elegance and zest to his version of 
postmodemism. In The Architecture of the Jumping Universe (1995), 
subtitled 'A Polemic: How Complexity Science is Changing Architecture and 
Culture,' Jencks limns a new, global paradigm, informed by nonlinear 
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dynamics. This paradigm accords with Cosmogenesis, or a new Genesis 
story, which describes the 'universe as a single, unfolding, creative event 
that is always reaching new levels of self-organisation.' More than that, the 
universe can be so madly inventive that it sometimes 'changes its mind and 
jumps.' 
In effect, Jencks wants to take a cue from the jumping universe to save 
postmodernism from its worst tendencies: 'ersatz, phoniness, camp, kitsch, 
the lies perpetuated by an electronic society.' Committed to an ecological, 
pluralist, and 'restructive' postmodemism, he understands, as Lyotard did 
not, that 'metanarratives have not ended but, rather, have become 
contested, and are seen now in their plurality.' It is this, rather than nihilism 
or relativism, in Jencks's view, that prompts 'a movement towards the 
fullness of different meanings and diverse ways of life, continuously created 
by an expanding universe' - a universe that seems to place human beings at 
the forefront of its 'cosmic lust for knowledge.' 
True, there is a measure of 'promiscuous fecundity' - Jencks's own 
phrase about his work - in all this, a measure of breezy speculation too. But I 
would never dismiss Jumping Universe as Brendan Gill, snoot in the air, 
dismissed it as 'a mash note to the cosmos.' Through all of Jencks's work, 
social and political concerns and a need to recover selected, traditional 
values keyed to the postmodem world share his interest in the cosmic and 
the spiritual. And who, really, knows enough to gainsay Jencks when he 
concludes, in another synoptic essay called 'The Post-Modem Agenda,' that 
though evil and catastrophe punctuate evolution, the universe harbors life, 
not just dead matter, and for human life 'what really matters is mind, and 
spirit.' 
FOUR 
We do not know enough to deny a vision of cosmogenic solace, but neither 
do we know enough to confirm it except as an article of informed and 
benevolent faith. Sooner or later, all roads of spiritual exploration lead to 
the crux of nihilism. 'We are nihilistic thoughts that come into God's head,' 
Kafka wrote in my first epigraph. Indeed, human consciousness itself, our 
rational faculty particularly, may be the seat of nihilism, which it projects 
everywhere, even into God's mind. For nothing can withstand the corrosive 
power of reason - it can reduce the universe to rust - nothing, except the will 
to believe and the will to power, both flowing into that inexplicable thing we 
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call Life. And Life, I hazard, is a quotidian mysticism, still ignorant of itself -
ignorant even if, as Emerson said, 'In the highest moments, we are a vision.' 
Certainly, nihilism has a bad name. In its most vulgar sense, it becomes 
a term of abuse or dismissal, though most often it denotes less an absence of 
values than values we disapprove. Cultures, on the whole, do not wish to be 
disturbed. They build their myths, religions, ideologies, build even their 
sciences, like mud walls, like straw screens against the blowing sand. 'The 
desert grows,' Nietzsche cried a century ago, and indeed it grows and grows. 
But is it not the desert we all continually traverse, since we can never cross it 
once and for all, neither in our personal nor in our collective lives? Is it easy 
to distinguish, in churning cultures, breakthrough from reversion, an act of 
creative destruction from another of mindless mayhem? 'Even though its 
motivation may be dread, anxiety, or horror vacui', Helmut Thielicke 
remarks in Nihilism (1961), 'what comes out of it [nihilism] is nevertheless 
imposing. .. He who knows what faith is must also have stood beneath the 
baleful eye of that demonic power against which we fling our faith.' More, is 
not nihilism a kind of penultimate sincerity? Is it not kin to self-emptying 
or kenosis, a white night of the soul that saints and mystics of every kind 
experience and we all but briefly glimpse? 'To come to the knowledge you 
have not,/ you must go by a way in which you know not. . ./ To come to be 
what you are not,/ you must go by a way in which you are not,' chanted St. 
John of the Cross. 
I will return to these queries presently, after noting the struggle of the 
West with nihilism, frozen shadow of its own spirit. From Job, who may 
have first felt its agony in his boils and bones, through various medieval 
mystics, on to Pascal, through various Russian anarchists, so chillingly 
depicted in the novels of Dostoevsky and Turgenev, down to the ideas of 
Schopenhauer, Stirner, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, 
and Jaspers, among many others, nihilism has stalked, sometimes haunted, 
the Western imagination. Max Stirner, we recall, had savaged all human 
values in Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum (1845) - translated as The Ego and 
His Own - and his successor, Nietzsche, had famously warned against 
looking too long into the abyss lest the abyss look back. Yet it was Nietzsche 
himself who plumbed the depths, announcing 'what must inevitably come: 
the dawn of nihilism' before going mad. In an early work, The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872), he had reasoned that only as an aesthetic phenomenon is the 
world justified; later, he settled for sheer endurance. As an 'aesthetic 
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phenomenon existence is still bearable for us,' he avows in The Gay Science 
(1887). 
Nietzsche may have wrestled the angel of nihilism to madness, but 
his insights into the contingencies of faith remain, with Kierkegaard's, the 
most penetrating we have. 'Gradually,' he says in The Gay Science, 'man has 
become a fantastic animal,' fantastic because he 'has to believe.' 
Furthermore, faith is most coveted and needed where will, 'the affect of 
command,' lacks. Hence fanaticism, the only strength that the weak or 
insecure can attain, seems a kind of hypnotism, a form of subjection to a 
stronger will. Nietzsche ends by addressing his bludgeoned readers thus: 
'No, you know better than that, friends. The hidden Yes in you is stronger 
than all the Nos and Maybes that afflict you and your age like a disease; and 
when you have to embark on the sea, you emigrants, you, too, are 
compelled to this by - a faith.' But the agon of purpose and contingency finds 
its most dazzling expression in Nietzsche's last work, The Will to Power 
(1901). Condemned to the terror of eternal recurrence - 'existence as it is, 
without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of 
nothingness' - humanity still affirms its defiant being. In this way, nihilism, 
as 'the highest degree of powerfulness of the spirit, the over-richest life,' 
becomes 'a divine way of thinking.' With a little help from art, which we 
possess 'lest we perish of the truth,' Nietzsche faces the void in strident 
triumph. 
My point has become obvious: in the dialectic of belief and radical 
doubt, a hairbreadth of hope separates faith from the absurd. If the 
proposition still seems philosophically let me flesh it with two 
literary examples, first of a modernist, then 'of a postmodemist writer. 
William Butler Yeats tells a lovely little story, called 'Where there is 
Nothing, there is God,' in his Mythologies (1959). On a hard winter night, in 
a little wooden house under the shadow of the wooden chapel, near 
Tullagh, as the Brothers bend over their handicrafts after twilight had 
driven them from the fields, Brother Dove explains to a dull, saintly boy 
why the ruby is a symbol of the love of God. 'Because,' Brother Dove says, 'it 
is red, like fire, and fire bums up everything, and where there is nothing, 
there is God.' The boy tacitly understands. Later, the abbot informs all the 
Brothers that a holy beggar they have taken in to tum their old quem may 
be Aengus the Lover of God, who after long seeking 'has found the nothing 
that is God.' The Brothers assent in silence; so does the boy. 
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Yeats was explicit on the matter in his autobiographical prose. 'Without 
the arbitrary there cannot be religion,' Yeats wrote in his Journal Ganuary 
1909). And in Per Amica Silentia Lunae (1917), he enjoins: 
We must not make a false faith by hiding from our thoughts the causes of doubt, for 
faith is the highest achievement of the human intellect, the only gift man can make to 
God, and therefore must be offered in sincerity ... I shall find the dark grow luminous, 
the void fruitful when I understand I have nothing ... 
In these two statements, the poet recalls both the randomness of existence 
and inexorableness of beliefs. 
I have alluded to Yeats though I could have alluded to other great 
modernists - in whom the aspiration to the spiritual was a foundation of 
modernism - because he went farther than his peers in breaching the 
supernatural without losing the credibility of his work. As Frank O'Connor 
jauntily put it: 'Once, in a fit of delighted exasperation, I said that [Yeats) was 
the only man I knew who could deduce a universal truth from two fallacies 
and an error.' Yeats himself preferred to think of himself as devout, his eyes 
filling with tears in childhood at the very thought of God; but at the end of 
his life, in a letter to Ethel Mannin (23 December 1938), he remarked: 'Am I a 
mystic? - no, I am a practical man. I have seen the raising of Lazarus and the 
loaves and fishes and have made the usual measurements, plummet line, 
spirit level, and have taken the temperature by pure mathematic.' Can we 
believe him? Did he know himself? Is this the language of a practical man? 
We can only half guess. 
Let us pass to a more sober witness. Asked who influenced his playcraft, 
Samuel Beckett, laconic as ever, replied, 'Yeats, who else?' I put aside the 
question of Beckett's postmodemity - is he really postmodem, is he not 
rather late modem?- and heed the geometer of the void himself. We have 
become familiar with his Pythagorean terrors and truths: astringencies of 
silence, the body as a ruined machine, the empty permutations within the 
skull, the mournful frolics of solipsism, the endurance of being on a scrap of 
stage, and the long, sad, inaudible wail of the spirit - all these rendered with 
relentless askesis, a stunning fidelity to failure in art: 'Failor ergo sum.' 
Beckett's aesthetic of absence does not merely flutter like butterflies of 
vertigo or glint quietly like the black diamond of despair; it also produces 
texts of the utmost rigor. One could choose from his works at random to 
witness how close he brings us to the edge of the abyss, without tumbling in 
26 
1997 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
it or leaping across it on the wings of faith. I choose an almost familiar text, 
alm:ost reassuring: 'Imagination Dead Imagine' from First Love and Other 
Stories (1974). The brief, bleached text ends thus: 
Leave them [two white bodies] there, sweating and icy, there is better elsewhere. No, 
life ends and no, there is nothing elsewhere, and ro question now of ever finding again 
that white speck lost in whiteness, to see if they still lie still in the stress of that 
storm, or of a worse storm, or in the black dark for good, or the great whiteness 
unchanging, and if not what they are doing. 
Such brave finality: life ends, nothing elsewhere, and no question now 
of ever finding again that white speck lost in whiteness, whatever it may 
have been, wherever and whenever it was. Really, Sam? Of course, Beckett 
knows no more about it than any of us; his immaculate words simply take 
the place of that 'white speck lost.' Only immaculate words, Sam? The 
question may never be answered but neither will the heart ever cease to ask 
it. And that, in fact, is the limit of nihilism, the rock, the need, on which it 
founders . 
CONCLUSION 
I have preferred here to regard nihilism as a radical condition of spirit, 
reverting in the West to Job or Ecclesiastes, and to regard spirit as a radical 
condition of being human. But the aspiration to nullity, the eschatology of 
the void, is hardly confined to the West. It may be rooted in amor mortis, a 
universal love of organic dissolution that Freud murkily mooted as a 'death 
instinct.' In any case, a benign nihilism of unattachment inheres in various 
mysticisms, East or West; inheres in certain religions too, like Buddhism, 
which affirms in the Heart Sutra that 'form is Emptiness and Emptiness is 
form;' inheres particularly in Zen, which things as they are, 
beyond merit, beyond our antinomies, things in their miraculous 
'inexistence'. Here is a wry saying from A Zen Haruest (1992): 
How funny! Bodhidharma's 
Nine years of zazen. 
What on earth did he seek? 
To the satori eye, 
Nothing exists from the beginning. 
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No doubt, there is freedom, exhilaration even, in unattachment, and in 
a certain perception of the void; no doubt, our second innocence is a kind of 
plenary indifference. John Cage - an exemplum of postmodern spirituality -
knew this when he wrote in Silence (1961): 
nothing is accomplished by writing a piece of music our ears are 
" hearing" now 
"playing" in excellent condition 
Cage is eminently - I nearly said gratuitously - to the point here. He has 
melded Western vanguardism with Eastern precepts, Dada with Zen. Yet 
this man, who claims his entire life could serve as an 'illustration' of the 
Upanishad's neti, neti ('not quite that'), and who thought that the 'proper 
purpose of music' was 'to sober and quiet the mind, thus rendering it 
susceptible to divine influences' according to an Indian precept - that man 
remains an American original. Like his father, a California inventor, Cage 
recalls the down-home, crackpot anarchism and creativity of the New 
World. In him, American Puritanism, Transcendentalism, and Pragmatism 
find secret complicities: a kind of willed and practical idealism, a kind of 
empiric transcendentalism, that are two steps removed from nihilism. 
Cage's lectures, entitled 'How to Improve the World (You Will Only Make 
Matters Worse),' instance this productive paradox. In any case, we dismiss 
Cage's playfulness at our peril. For it is the place where laughter and 
creation, self-heedlessness and commitment, chance and order, meet - that 
is, the place where the human spirit renews itself. 
In Cage, I have said, spirit finds exemplary - and paradoxically unique -
expression of itself in postmodern times. But the issue is not the singularity, 
let alone the 'eccentricity,' of Cage. It is, rather, our reluctance to accede to 
spirit in our moment. What makes the language of spirit so generally 
inaccessible to us? Surely, it is not only the condition of the fractious 
humanities in America; nor is it only the rage of fundamentalists, left and 
right, east, west, north, and south. The difficulty of spirit is more essential. 
Shockingly put, the needs of spirit and the needs of morality or justice often 
clash. 
Kierkegaard stated the case harrowingly in the parable of Abraham and 
Isaac - a father ready to murder his son for love of God - as did Nietzsche in 
all his desperate transvaluations beyond good and evil. These thinkers, 
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however eccentric in their ways, maintained on this issue a ruthless clarity. 
Even George Santayana, that urbane and skeptical mind, wondered in 
Platonism and the Spiritual Life (1957), if morality was not a 'worse enemy 
of spirit than immorality: if it was 'not more hopelessly deceptive and 
entangling?' In other words, is not spirit less a form of moral knowledge of 
the world than of disillusionment, the first, huge step to reality? 'Spirit 
chills the flesh and is itself on fire: Santayana concludeQ.. That same amoral 
violence haunted, and still haunts, Western artists. Thus, for instance, Yeats 
in Essays and Introductions: 
It was many years before I understood that we must not demand even the welfare of the 
human race, nor traffic with divinity in our prayers. It moves oulside our antinomies, it 
may be our lot to worship in terror: "Did He who made the lamb make thee?" 
Would Robert Lowell or Norman Mailer- would John Ashbery, I wonder-
disagree? 
Our liberal imagination recoils before such afront to our decencies. But 
why such enforced, such self-protective innocence on our part? We know 
the record: all those masters of modernism who combined the highest 
spiritual intensities with egregious moral or political failures. We also know 
nobler delusions- or are they visionary truths? -Blake's belief, for instance, 
that the 'world of Imagination is the world of Eternity: and the belief of 
Shelley, Arnold, Yeats, Joyce - all the way to the artists of 'Negotiating 
Rapture' - that art could substitute for religion. And what massive hypocrisy 
persuades us now that ideologies can substitute for reality (I mean the 
whole, unknowable truth) and dispense with spirit? 
True, we need to make the world habitable for ourselves and safe for 
our personal version of democracy. We need, above all, to cheat death 
awhile and evade its dematerialising -that is, its spiritual - claim. William 
Dunbar rimed it five hundred years ago: 
The stait of man dois change et vary 
Now sound, now seik, now blyth, now sary, 
Now dansand mirry, now like to dee: 
Timor mortis contwbat me. 
But we risk shallowness, coarseness, cowardice when we gorge on 
ideology or sedate ourselves with the bromides of righteousness - that is, 
when we avert the harsh claims of spirit on our existence. Yes, poverty, 
injustice, disease may be allayed by material means, though the rich, exalted, 
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and hale continue to suffer afflictions of their own. Still, I wonder: can the 
world's evil diminish by material means alone? Will the collective miseries 
of humanity dissolve, or even distinctly reduce; by attending only to the 
corporeal needs of the individual? And if they reduce, what other evils will 
remain? (Evolutionary biology gives no reassurances on this point.) Indeed; 
man and woman have never lived by bread alone. Therein lies the 
indefeasible limit of politics, the insoluble trespass of power. The scales of 
justice lock us into their steely rhythm, now up, now down, like a common 
see-saw; the cycles of revolution spin on. Thus we condemn ourselves to 
repetition, to a sickening triteness of being, without hint of ultimacy or 
intimation of self-transcendence in our lives. 
Our arts, like ourselves, suffer no less from that triteness of being. 
Without a sense of ultimacy - what George Steiner calls 'real presences' - our 
arts become a tissue of jokes, ironies, barren virtuosities. 'Does this mean 
that all adult poesis, that everything we recognize as being of a compelling 
stature in literature, art, music is of a religious inspiration or reference?' 
Steiner asks in Real Presences (1989). His answer, as a matter of history and 
pragmatic inventory, is unequivocally affirmative. 'It may well be that the 
forgetting of the question of God will be the nub of cultures now nascent,' 
Steiner continues. 
It may be that the verticalities of reference to 'higher things,' to the impalpable and 
mythical which are still incised in our grammars ... will drain from speech. Should 
these mutations of consciousness and expression ccme into force, the forms of aesthetic 
making as we have known them will no longer be productive. 
Some may think these statements overwrought; I see in them traces of 
Steiner's genius for truthful exaggeration. Be that as it may, I am willing to 
leave God out of the matter, since I personally find no words to qualify or 
invoke that Name. But I am unwilling to leave spirit out, spirit as I have 
spoken of it, as much an issue of nihilism as of belief. A great writer may 
deny meaning to spirit- witness Kafka, Beckett- but we think it vulgar and 
vapid if he do so without trace of despair; and we note how often he returns 
to deny. 
I conclude without solace. The stutter of spirit, the struggle for belief, 
remain primal in our condition. In this regard, nihilism may appear a 
saving grace, the breakneck candor of a mind insisting on its own lucidity. 
Let us honor such lucidity: not even the forgiving earth sanctions every 
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vapid, errant, or wicked belief. But by far in the most cases, such lucidity 
finally fails. Nor does irony, which Kierkegaard called the 'infinitely delicate 
play with nothingness,' suffice. Heart and mind continue to cry out to hell, 
to heaven, for something more. The cry is hopeless, its very hopelessness 
indistinguishable from hope on the other side of despair. At last comes that 
moment Yeats described: 
Now his wars on God begin; 
At stroke of midnight God will win. 
But what does it mean for God to win? 
• I completed this essay without benefit of telepathic knowledge of a more persuasive 
exhibition in Australia, called 'Spirit + Place,' which opened in January 1997 at the Museum 
of Contemporary Art in Sydney. 
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